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Mediation as the Key to the 
Successful Transfer of the Case of 
Jean-Bosco Uwinkindi from the 
Jurisdiction of the ICTR to the 
Republic of Rwanda 
Taylor Friedlander* 
INTRODUCTION 
The leaves of banana trees make a distinct sound when they are stirred 
by the wind.  It is almost like a whisper.  Just outside the capital city of 
Rwanda, there is a place so quiet that silence is often the only sound you 
hear.  This place is the Kayenzi Church.1  It once was a place of worship, but 
today it serves as a memorial site to commemorate victims of the Rwandan 
genocide.2  If you were to visit the site and step down into the basement, 
there would be the creaking of stairs sighing beneath your weight, and a 
gasp might escape your lips if it does not get caught in your throat.  The 
sight that meets your eyes will be an expanse of bones, piled in stacks that 
touch the ceiling.  These bones are laid to rest in memory of the 2,000 
 
* Taylor Friedlander received her Juris Doctor from Pepperdine University School of Law in 2013. 
1. The Kayenzi Church is located in the sector of Nyamata, outside Rwanda’s capital city, 
Kigali.   Prosecutor v. Uwinkindi, Case No. ICTR-2001-75-I, Indictment, ¶ 2 (Sept. 11, 2001), 
available at http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Uwinkindi/indictment/uwinkindi.pdf. 
2. Nyamata Memorial Site, KIGALI MEMORIAL CENTRE, http://www.kigalimemorialcentre
.org/old/centre/other/nymata.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2012). 
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victims whose lives were lost at and around the church,3 merely a fraction of 
the estimated 500,000 to 1 million people killed.4 
There was not one person, but many who carried out the murders that 
took place at the Kayenzi Church during the Rwanda genocide.  The first 
section that follows will provide the historical background of Rwanda 
genocide and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), which 
would subsequently be created to try the most high-profile suspects involved 
in perpetrating the genocide.  The second section will focus on one suspect 
in particular, Jean Bosco Uwinkindi, providing background on his case.  The 
third section will explain how four different systems of justice should be 
involved in prosecuting Uwinkindi in order to fulfill the objectives of justice 
held by both Rwanda and the international community.  The fourth section 
will focus on the reason why Uwinkindi’s case is important to Rwandan 
jurisprudence, as it is the first case in history to be transferred from the ICTR 
to the jurisdiction of the National Judiciary of Rwanda.  This section also 
will analyze the reasons why the ICTR decided to transfer the case, and will 
suggest that mediation should be used to make the execution of the transfer 
process as smooth as possible.  The fifth and final section will provide a 
brief conclusion, emphasizing the hopeful outlook for the relationship 
between the ICTR and National Judiciary of Rwanda, especially if mediation 
techniques are utilized in the future. 
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE RWANDA GENOCIDE AND THE ICTR 
A. Historical Background of the Rwanda Genocide 
The Rwanda Genocide may have been carried out in 1994, but the seeds 
of hatred that led to the atrocities were sown long before.  Two ethnic 
groups, the Tutsis and the Hutus, lived in Rwanda together for centuries, but 
 
3. According to the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda’s (ICTR) indictment of 
Uwinkindi, 2,000 corpses were found at or near the Kayenzi Church.  Uwinkindi, Case No. ICTR-
2001-75-I, Indictment, ¶ 25.  However, according to the Kigali Memorial Center, 2,500 people were 
killed at or near the church.  Nyamata Memorial Site, supra note 2.  The disjunction between these 
estimates is due to the fact that investigations of the genocide sites were often conducted by 
untrained observers.  ALISON DES FORGES, LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY 16 (Human Rights 
Watch, 1999). 
4. PHIL CLARK, THE GACACA COURTS, POST GENOCIDE JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION IN 
RWANDA: JUSTICE WITHOUT LAWYERS 1 (Cambridge University Press, 2010).  It is difficult for 
researchers to gauge accurately the number of people killed during the genocide due to lack of 
census data prior to 1994 and the fact that death tolls are “usually informed more by emotion than 
fact.”  DES FORGES, supra note 3, at 15–16.  However, even with conservative estimates as to the 
number of Tutsis killed, it is believed that at least 500,000 lost their lives.  Id. 
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not as equals.5  Around 1000 AD, the Hutu people arrived in Rwanda and 
inhabited the land,6 but were dominated by the Tutsi’s militaristic conquest 
in 1500 AD.7  Rwandan society settled into a clearly defined hierarchy 
polarized between “Hutus,” the subordinates, and “Tutsis,” the minority 
class of people who ruled over their many subjects.8  However, these 
identities were not set in stone: a Tutsi could become a Hutu by losing 
prestige, while a Hutu could become a Tutsi by acquiring wealth.9  During 
this domination, Hutus were brewing resentments against the Tutsis, but it 
was not until Belgium colonized Rwanda that those sentiments reached a 
boil.10 
Belgium gained colonial control of Rwanda in 1919 and instituted 
policies that deepened the divide between the majority Hutus and minority 
Tutsis.11  The most notable policy was the issuance of ethnic identity cards 
in 1933.12  Whereas before, identification as a Tutsi or Hutu could change 
with life circumstances, such identification was now permanently etched 
into government documents.13  For years, Belgium encouraged the belief 
amongst Rwandans that Tutsis were the superior minority class.14  However, 
after World War II, Rwanda was placed under a United Nations trusteeship, 
 
5. CLARK, supra note 4, at 16. 
6. Id. at 15.  Prior to the arrival of the Hutus, the Twa, a people of hunter-gatherers, had 
inhabited Rwanda.  Id.  Today, the Twa make up approximately one percent of the Rwandan 
population.  Id. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. at 16. 
9. Id. 
10. See id. at 16–17.  While Belgium has left the longest lasting colonial impact on Rwanda, 
Germany was the first country to colonize Rwanda.  Id. at 16.  In 1894, German colonists arrived at 
Rwanda and began to forge an alliance with the Tutsis, the apparent and actual leaders.  Id.  Belgium 
then gained control of Rwanda under a League of Nations mandate in 1919 and continued to foster a 
relationship with the Tutsi leaders.  Id. 
11. Id. at 16.  In addition to issuing of ethnic identity cards, Belgium also required the Hutus to 
participate in forced labor for government projects, under the supervision of the Tutsis.  Id. at 16–17 
12. Id. at 16. 
13. Id. at 16–17.  Prior to Belgium’s colonial rule, status as a Hutu or Tutsi was fluid.  One 
factor used to determine whether a person was a Hutu or a Tutsi was the number of cows owned: a 
person with ten or more head of cattle was deemed a Tutsi, and with any fewer, was categorized as a 
Hutu.  Id. at 17.  By this standard, two people related by blood could be classified as belonging to 
different races based on their prosperity levels.  As a result, it was not uncommon that family 
members turned on their own kinsmen during the genocide when Hutus were pitted against Tutsis.  
Apocalypse, KIGALI MEMORIAL CENTRE, http://www.kigalimemorialcentre.org/old/genocide/rwanda
/thegenocide.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2012). 
14. See id. at 16–17. 
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designed to lead Rwanda to independence.15  With Rwanda’s autonomy on 
the horizon, Belgium reevaluated its alliance with the Tutsis, realizing that 
once Rwanda became self-governing, the Hutu majority would most likely 
seize control.16  As a result, Belgium shifted its alliance to the Hutu majority, 
aiding them in their transition to power.17 
In 1959, the Parti du Mouvement de l’Emancipation des Bahutu 
(PARMEHUTU), a Hutu political party, came into power with the support 
of Belgium,18 and exiled over 700,000 Tutsis from Rwanda between 1959 
and 1973.19  The PARMEHUTU also incited mass killings of more than 
100,000 Tutsis by characterizing them as Hutu oppressors.20  Not wanting to 
be seen as subversive, many Rwandans were afraid to speak out against the 
totalitarian governance of the PARMEHUTU, thereby fostering a culture of 
impunity.21  Tutsis were treated as second-class citizens,22 a legacy that 
President Juvenal Habyarimana continued once he came into power in 
1973.23  Habyarimana proclaimed that the number of civil service jobs and 
school placements should reflect the ethnic makeup of the country.24  This 
policy greatly reduced the opportunities for Tutsis to find placements in 
universities and well-paid jobs.25 
 
15. Id. at 17. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. at 18. 
19. Path to a “Final Solution”, KIGALI MEMORIAL CENTRE, http://www.kigalimemorialcentre
.org/old/genocide/rwanda/political.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2012). 
20. See IMMACULÉE ILIBAGIZA, LEFT TO TELL: DISCOVERING GOD AMIDST THE RWANDAN 
HOLOCAUST 15 (Hay House, Inc., 2006).  See also CLARK, supra note 4, at 18. 
21. Id. 
22. See ILIBAGIZA, supra note 20, at 15. 
23. See id. at 18. 
24. Id.  The ethnic composition of Rwanda prior to the genocide was 85% Hutu, 14% Tutsi, 
and 1%Twa.  Id.  The Twa are a minority tribe in Rwanda.  See infra note 6. 
25. ILIBAGIZA, supra note 20, at 18.  Immaculée Ilibagiza, a survivor of the Rwandan 
genocide, was denied a scholarship to fund her secondary education based on her racial background, 
despite being ranked as one of the top two students in a class of sixty.  Id. at 17–18. 
4
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While the Tutsis suffered within Rwanda, the Tutsi diaspora that lived 
beyond the borders shared a similar plight.26  As refugees, they were denied 
basic rights to which their neighbors were entitled.27  If a revolution may be 
justified by the oppression of a minority, then the deprivation that the Tutsis 
suffered both in Rwanda and beyond its borders would be sufficient to spur 
an uprising.  On October 1, 1990, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a 
group of Tutsi diaspora living in Uganda, invaded Rwanda with the intent of 
reclaiming the homeland they had been expelled from.28  A civil war 
erupted, and in the midst of peace negotiations, then President Juvenal 
Habyarimana was killed when his plane was shot down on April 6, 1994.29  
The President’s death triggered the genocide that followed.30  Although the 
United Nations had a presence in Rwanda, with the UN Assistance Mission 
for Rwanda (UNAMIR) stationed in the country, it failed to act.31  Over the 
next three months, Rwanda descended into genocidal violence until the RPF 
won the civil war and declared victory on July 18, 1994, thereby ending the 
 
26. See STEPHEN KINZER, A THOUSAND HILLS: RWANDA’S REBIRTH AND THE MAN WHO 
DREAMED IT 35 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2008).  Rwandan refugees in Uganda were forced to live 
in remote refugee camps, where they were provided rations by a relief truck every one to two weeks.  
Id. at 12.  After a year, many refugees found themselves uprooted, without explanation, and forced 
to resettle in a new location.  Id. 
27. See id. at 35. 
28. CLARK, supra note 4, at 12–13; The RPF Invasion, KIGALI MEMORIAL CENTRE, http://
www.kigalimemorialcentre.org/old/genocide/rwanda/invasion.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2011). 
29. KINZER, Supra note 26, at 137–39.  The party responsible for President Habyarimana’s 
death was never determined, although some theories implicate the RPF’s involvement.  Id. at 139. 
30. CLARK, supra note 4, at 14.  President Habyarimana’s death did not cause a spontaneous 
outburst of violence, but rather, was the triggering event for a premeditated plan of violence against 
the Tutsis to be carried out.  Id. 
31. DES FORGES, supra note 3, at 595–99.  An informant, codenamed “Jean-Pierre,” reported 
to the Force Commander of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) (then 
stationed in the country) that 1,700 soldiers were being trained in the Rwandan army for the purpose 
of exterminating the Tutsis.  Although the Force Commander of UNAMIR, Romeo Dallaire, wrote a 
code cable on January 11, 1994 to the UN headquarters in New York, it failed to respond.  FRED 
GRUNFELD & ANKE HUIJBOOM, THE FAILURE TO PREVENT GENOCIDE IN RWANDA: THE ROLE OF 
BYSTANDERS 95–97 (Martinus Nijhoff 2007). 
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genocide.32  Following the ceasefire, thousands of Tutsi exiles returned to 
their home country33 and the rule of Rwanda fell to a new regime that sought 
to represent both the Tutsis and Hutus without bias towards any one group.34  
After centuries of being ruled by a government dominated by either the 
Hutus or the Tutsis, Rwanda had a government that, for the first time, 
refused to align itself with a racial identity.  The graphic below indicates the 
rise and fall of Tutsi and Hutu regimes preceding the RPF’s new form of 
leadership. 
 
 
32. KINZER, supra note 26, at 177.  Although the RPF victory put an end to the genocidal 
violence to be carried out by the PARMEHUTU, the RPF also committed atrocities and were 
accused of carrying out massacres and executions against civilians.  The lack of prosecution against 
the RPF is beyond the scope of this article.  DES FORGES, supra note 3, at 16. 
33. Id. at 311.  Many of the Tutsi exiles returning to Rwanda had left as children or were born 
outside Rwanda and had never before stepped foot in their homeland.  Id. 
34. KINZER, supra note 26, at 186.  After the RPF declared victory, it established a 
government with both Hutu and Tutsi leaders in order to gain popular support, especially from Hutu 
Rwandans.  Id.  Although the RPF consisted primarily of Tutsis, there were also several members of 
Hutu descent.  Id.  The RPF selected one of its most prominent Hutu members as the new president 
as a strategic move to gain support for the new regime.  Id.  Today, Rwanda’s government strongly 
discourages people from making any reference to race, and the very words “Hutu” and “Tutsi” have 
become taboo.  See Richard Grant, Paul Kagame: Rwanda’s Redeemer of Ruthless Dictator?, THE 
TELEGRAPH (July 22, 2010, 9:00 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews
/africaandindianocean/rwanda/7900680/Paul-Kagame-Rwandas-redeemer-or-ruthless-dictator.html.  
The current president, Paul Kagame, declared that the people of his country should no longer be 
divided by race, as they “are all Rwandans now.”  Id. 
6
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 13, Iss. 3 [2013], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol13/iss3/3
[Vol. 13:453, 2013]  
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL 
459 
This new leadership was optimistic, but it would have to lead a war-torn 
nation faced with the challenge of prosecuting 100,000 cases of people 
accused of genocide.35 
B. Historical Background of the ICTR 
i. History of the ICTR 
In the wake of the genocide, not one of Rwanda’s courts remained 
standing, and of the approximately 800 lawyers and judges in Rwanda 
before the genocide, only 40 were still alive.36  The genocide had destroyed 
the national judiciary.  The United Nations therefore saw not only a practical 
need for establishing a criminal tribunal to try the cases of genocide,37 but a 
symbolic one as well.  Given that genocidaires were accused of committing 
crimes against humanity that violated international law, their cases were of 
international stature and merited trial by an international tribunal.38  In 
response to this need, the United Nations Security Council passed 
Resolution 955 to create the ICTR, with one of its major goals being to 
“[send] a strong message to Africa’s leaders and warlords” against the 
impunity that lead to Rwanda’s genocide, and to thereby “[provide] an 
example to be followed in other parts of the world where these kinds of 
crimes have also been committed.”39  Thus, the ICTR was focused not only 
on justice at a national level within Rwanda, but also at an international 
level. 
 
35. Post Genocide Justice, KIGALI MEMORIAL CENTRE, http://www.kigalimemorialcentre.org
/old/genocide/rwanda/justice.html  (last visited Feb. 20, 2012). 
36. Jesse Melman, The Possibility Of Transfer(?): A Comprehensive Approach to the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’s Rule 11bis to Permit Transfer to Rwandan Domestic 
Courts, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 1271, 1277 (2010). 
37. Special Rapporteur for Rwanda of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 
Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda, ¶¶ 79, 81, S/1994/1157 (Nov. 14, 1994) (by 
René Degni-Ségui) (describing Rwanda’s need for international assistance with judicial and law 
enforcement personnel, as well as the need for an International Court and local courts “to try persons 
responsible for genocide, in order to stop, or at least reduce, acts of reprisal”). 
38. S.C. Res. 955, preamble, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) (“[T]he establishment of an 
international tribunal for the prosecution of persons responsible for genocide and the other above-
mentioned violations of international humanitarian law will contribute to ensuring that such 
violations are halted and effectively redressed . . . .”). 
39. General Information, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, http://www
.unictr.org/AboutICTR/GeneralInformation/tabid/101/Default.aspx (last visited Feb. 20, 2012). 
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As the Security Council prepared for the creation of the ICTR, Rwanda 
advocated that the tribunal should be located in Rwanda.40  However, in the 
wake of the genocide, the Security Council feared that Rwanda would not be 
secure enough to support an international tribunal, and therefore, placed the 
ICTR in Arusha, Tanzania, despite protests by Rwandan officials.41  
Consequently, the decision to locate the ICTR in a different country came at 
the cost of distancing Rwandans from the justice being carried out on behalf 
of the crimes suffered in their country.42 
Although under Resolution 955, the ICTR and the National Judiciary of 
Rwanda have concurrent jurisdiction over crimes of genocide, the ICTR has 
primacy, meaning that it can compel Rwanda or any other jurisdiction to 
transfer a case to its own jurisdiction.43  As a result, the ICTR has the 
authority to try the cases of the most serious offenders, while most of the 
victims are unable to attend the hearings or even learn about the process.  
The net effect is that the victims are left to feel as though the justice process 
does not address their interests.  In fact, it was not until 1998 that Rwanda’s 
radio system was able to establish a service to inform Rwandans about the 
progress of the trials.44 
Rwanda was not alone in resisting a policy that gave international courts 
superior jurisdiction over that of national courts.  National governments 
frequently want to prosecute the perpetrators who carried out atrocities 
within their countries and are often reluctant to relinquish jurisdiction over 
such crimes to international tribunals.45  It follows naturally then that the 
ICTR’s policy of primacy undermined the autonomy of Rwanda’s national 
judiciary in its ability to hear cases of Rwandan genocidaires. 
The national courts of Rwanda may only hear a case that the ICTR has 
asserted jurisdiction over if that case has been formally transferred from the 
ICTR to the National Judiciary of Rwanda.  In order for this transfer to take 
place, the National Judiciary of Rwanda must comply with the stipulations 
set out in the ICTR Rules of Evidence and Procedure under Rule 11bis.46  
 
40. Melman, supra note 36, at 1279 (citing U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc. 
S/PV.3453 (Nov. 8, 1994)). 
41. Melman, supra note 36, at 1279. 
42. DES FORGES, supra note 3, at 746. 
43. S.C. Res. 955, Article 28(2)(e), U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) (declaring that states 
shall comply with requests made by the Trial Chamber of the ICTR with requests for “[t]he 
surrender or the transfer of the accused to the International Tribunal for Rwanda”). 
44. DES FORGES, supra note 3, at 742. 
45. Stephanos Bibas & William W. Burke-White, International Idealism Meets Domestic-
Criminal-Procedure Realism, 59 DUKE L.J. 637, 646 (2010). 
46. Rules of Procedure and Evidence for the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda, Rule 
11bis (June 29, 1995). 
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Thus, a motion to transfer a case from the ICTR to the National Judiciary of 
Rwanda will hereinafter be referred to as an “11bis motion.”  The ICTR 
granted the first 11bis motion on June 28, 2011 for the case of Jean Bosco 
Uwinkindi, which is discussed more thoroughly in the second and third 
sections of this article. 
ii. Effects of the ICTR: Successes and Shortcomings 
Over the course of the fifteen years that the ICTR has been actively 
trying genocidaires, it has completed a total of thirty-eight cases.47  While 
this number may seem miniscule when compared to the thousands of cases 
prosecuted by the National Judiciary of Rwanda,48 it is important to note that 
domestic courts and international courts have fundamentally different 
objectives.  Domestic courts handle a broad spectrum of cases—from the 
trivial to the most serious—and therefore have an exponentially larger 
caseload.  As a result, they must balance priorities of efficiency and justice.  
Conversely, international courts adjudicate a narrowly selected caseload of 
high profile crimes, and consequently, are in a position to prioritize justice 
over efficiency.49 
A major policy consideration driving international justice is the idea that 
adjudicating high profile crimes may impact the global community in such a 
manner as to deter future atrocities.50  The ICTR embodies this ideology, and 
charges itself with the duty to pass on the lessons learned from the Rwanda 
genocide in order to prevent a repetition of such crimes that may be 
committed in other parts of the world.51  Therefore, the ICTR is not only 
attempting to bring justice to Rwanda for the crimes that taint its past, but 
 
47. Completed Cases, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL OF RWANDA, 
http://unictr.org/Cases/tabid/77/Default.aspx?id=4&mnid=4 (last visited Feb. 20, 2012). 
48. Post Genocide Justice, KIGALI MEMORIAL CENTRE, http://www.kigalimemorialcentre.org
/old/genocide/rwanda/justice.html. 
49. Bibas & Burke-White, supra note 45, at 651–52 (“[I]nternational law targets a few high-
level, highly public, politically salient mass atrocities, which often arise out of political instability.”). 
50. See Bibas & Burke-White, supra note 45, at 651–52 (“[I]nternational criminal justice, 
which can use a few cases to send messages, is better than domestic criminal justice at the more 
symbolic functions of punishing, vindicating victims, teaching, healing, and reconciling.”). 
51. General Information, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, http://www
.unictr.org/AboutICTR/GeneralInformation/tabid/101/Default.aspx (last visited Feb. 20, 2012).  The 
ICTR has made landmark decisions that shape international criminal justice today: it applied the 
United Nations 1948 Convention Against Genocide for the first time in history.  Adama Dieng, 
Capacity-Building Efforts of the ICTR: A Different Kind of Legacy, 9 NW. U. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 
403, 404 (2011). 
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also is hoping to create a deterrent effect that will be of worldwide benefit in 
the future. 
Supporters of the ICTR believe that its activities have had the desired 
deterrent effect.  Since its inception, fifteen countries have turned over 
discovered genocidaires within their borders to the ICTR, which the ICTR 
believes has resulted in “a progressive realization in these countries that they 
cannot allow fugitives from international justice in their domain.”52  While 
the ICTR claims to have benefitted the international community, whether 
Rwanda has benefitted as a nation is another issue altogether. 
The ICTR’s proceedings had the unintended effect of undermining a 
sense of justice among Rwandans at national and local levels.  Criminals 
prosecuted by the tribunal, charged with the most severe crimes in 
international criminal jurisprudence, usually enjoy a better quality of life in 
the ICTR’s prison facilities than individuals accused of lesser crimes and 
held in Rwandan courts.  The ICTR itself reports that prisoners receive 
“meals that are prepared under the supervision of a qualified dietician and 
medical officer,” as well as “periods of common activity such as religious 
observance, educational classes or physical exercise.”53 
Meanwhile, genocidaires tried in Rwanda were often underfed, only had 
access to dirty drinking water, and lived in cells where they were often 
compelled to sleep in latticework formations because of the lack of space.54  
Although Rwanda’s prison conditions have improved drastically in recent 
years, during the years immediately following the genocide, the conditions 
were dismal.55  While international and regional agreements advocate for 
living conditions that allow prisoners to maintain their health and dignity,56 
 
52. General Information, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, http://www
.unictr.org/AboutICTR/GeneralInformation/tabid/101/Default.aspx (last visited Feb. 20, 2012). 
53. Detention of Suspects and Convicted Persons, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR 
RWANDA, http://www.unictr.org/AboutICTR/FactSheets/DetentionofSuspectsandConvictedPersons
/tabid/114/Default.aspx (last visited Feb. 20, 2012). 
54. CLARK, supra note 4, at 50. 
55. CLARK, supra note 4, at 99.  While Rwanda’s prison conditions were some of the worst in 
the world in the years immediately following the genocide, those conditions have improved 
dramatically as a result of aid provided by the Red Cross and the Dutch government.  Id.  Such 
assistance has enabled Rwanda to construct additional prison facilities.  Id.  While in the year 2000, 
there were approximately 120,000 prisoners held in overcrowded penitentiaries, this number 
decreased as genocidaires completed their prison sentences, easing the overcrowding, and thereby 
improving living conditions.  Mpanga, a Stronghold for the UN in Rwanda, INTERNATIONAL 
JUSTICE TRIBUNE (May 4, 2008, 11:00 PM) http://www.rnw.nl/international-justice/article/mpanga-
stronghold-un-rwanda.  As of 2008, approximately 58,000 prisoners were being held in facilities 
throughout Rwanda.  Id. 
56. African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Ouagadougou Declaration and Plan 
of Action on Accelerating Prisons and Penal Reforms in Africa, ¶ 4, Sept. 22, 2002, 
http://www.achpr.org/english/declarations/declaration_ouagadougou_en.html. 
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Rwanda’s lack of resources in the wake of the genocide made compliance 
with such standards unattainable.  As a result, there was a stark contrast 
between the ideal living conditions for prisoners provided by the ICTR to 
individuals accused of the worst crimes, versus the conditions experienced 
by those accused of lesser crimes and held in Rwanda’s penitentiaries.  The 
high quality of life provided to suspects being prosecuted by the ICTR when 
compared to the quality of life experienced by Rwandan prisoners—or even 
by Rwandans living freely but in poverty—made many question whether the 
ICTR was truly delivering justice. 
When the Security Council called for the establishment of the ICTR, its 
placement in Tanzania instead of Rwanda was based on the belief that a 
court could derive integrity from its geography.  At the time, the Security 
Council and United Nations believed that establishing the Tribunal in 
Tanzania, which was more secure than Rwanda, would better facilitate the 
deliverance of justice.57  However, as international criminal justice evolved, 
it became clear that international justice could leave behind a more powerful 
legacy when the court delivering justice is embedded in the community 
where the crimes occurred.58  For this reason, the United Nations Special 
Court for Sierra Leone, another site of international criminal trials, is located 
within its own boundaries, despite the fact that Sierra Leone was scarcely 
more secure than Rwanda following the genocide.59  While the family and 
friends of victims of the Sierra Leone tragedy are able to benefit from an 
international court in-country, the family and friends of the victims of the 
Rwanda genocide have experienced a strained relationship with the ICTR. 
The ICTR’s location in Arsuha, Tanzania limits the positive effects that 
Rwanda can garner from the Tribunal.  This distance of the Tribunal from 
the country where the genocide took place prevents the healing effects of 
justice from being fully experienced in Rwanda, as the developments of the 
cases are not readily accessible to Rwandans.  While a local paper in 
Tanzania, THE ARUSHA TIMES, dedicates a page to Tribunal developments,60 
 
57. Interview with Martin Ngoga, Prosecutor General of Rwanda, Umubano Hotel in Kigali, 
Rwanda (July 7, 2011). 
58. Id.  International courts that are located in-country (also termed “international domestic 
courts” or “semi-internationalized courts”) are “proximate to the events in question, have the best 
access to relevant evidence, and may be able to play a positive role in the local processes of 
reconciliation.”  Therefore, courts that are located in country have the ability to provide a significant 
impact on international criminal justice.  William W. Burke-White, A Community of Courts: Toward 
A System of International Criminal Law Enforcement, 24 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 24 (2002). 
59. Interview with Martin Ngoga, supra note 57. 
60. Dieng, supra note 51, at 407–08. 
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Rwandan knowledge of the proceedings is limited by whether Rwandan 
journalists are able to report on them.  As a result, by the time that the results 
of a case reach Rwandans, it is not uncommon for Rwandans to feel that 
they were not part of the justice process.61  This sentiment often intensifies 
when Rwandans learn of the ICTR’s decisions to acquit suspects.  In 
October 2011, members of Ibuka, one of Rwanda’s largest support 
organizations for genocide survivors,62 expressed outrage when the ICTR 
acquitted Casmir Bizimungu and Jerome Bicamumpaka, two government 
ministers suspected of committing genocide.63  Ibuka’s frustration likely 
stems from the attenuated relationship between the ICTR and the Rwandan 
community as a result of its contentious history and geographic distance. 
Additionally, the distance of the ICTR’s location in Tanzania from 
Rwandan lawyers and advocates has made it more difficult for those 
individuals to argue that the allocation of resources be divided equally 
between the ICTR and the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia 
(ICTY).  The ICTY was created at the same time as the ICTR, and the two 
tribunals share the same resources, including personnel.64  Between the 1999 
and 2003, which proved to be one of the most turbulent times in the 
relationship between Rwanda and the ICTR, Carla del Ponte served as the 
Prosecutor General for both the ICTR and the ICTY.65  Del Ponte spent the 
vast majority of her time working on ICTY matters in the Hague, and as a 
result, Rwandan advocates felt that justice was not being carried out on their 
behalf; 66 in fact, Rwanda called for her resignation several times.67  In 2003, 
Hassan Bubacar Jallow, a Gambian lawyer, was assigned the post of 
Prosecutor General and charged with responsibility for the ICTR only, and 
not the ICTY.68  This appointment acknowledged Rwanda’s need for a 
Prosecutor General who would dedicate sufficient time and effort only to 
Rwanda’s genocide cases, thereby contributing to an ease in tensions 
between the ICTR and Rwanda.  The relationship between Rwanda and the 
ICTR will likely continue to improve as the ICTR takes more actions that 
 
61. DES FORGES, supra note 3, at 742. 
62. IBUKA, http://www.ibuka.rw (last visited Feb. 20, 2012). 
63. James Karuhanga, Ibuka Considers Protests Over ICTR Acquittals, NEW TIMES (Oct. 5, 
2011), http://www.newtimes.co.rw/news/index.php?i=14769&a=45890. 
64. Registrars of ICTR and ICTY Sign Statement of Cooperation, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
TRIBUNAL FOR YUGOSLAVIA (Sept. 21, 2001), http://www.icty.org/sid/7952. 
65. See Interview with Carla del Ponte, HIRONDELLE NEWS (Sept. 16, 2003), http://www
.hirondellenews.com/content/view/692/26/. 
66. Interview with Martin Ngoga, supra note 57. 
67. Interview with Carla del Ponte, supra note 65. 
68. Office of the Prosecution, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, 
http://www.unictr.org/AboutICTR/ICTRStructure/OfficeoftheProsecution/tabid/104/Default.aspx 
(last visited Feb. 20, 2012). 
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acknowledge Rwanda’s needs and expectations.  For this reason, the ICTR’s 
recent decision to transfer a case, for the first time in history, from the ICTR 
to the National Judiciary of Rwanda may have pivotal effects in the 
relationship between the ICTR and Rwanda.  A discussion of this case and 
the transfer decision follows. 
II. THE CASE OF PASTOR JEAN BOSCO UWINKINDI 
On June 28, 2011, the ICTR made a precedential decision to transfer the 
case of Jean Bosco Uwinkindi from its jurisdiction to the National Judiciary 
of Rwanda.  Uwinkindi’s story is one defined by a series of transfers, the 
first of which took place on a personal and spiritual level.  During the 
Rwanda genocide, some pastors had a greater desire to serve their political 
interests then to serve their penitents.  Jean Bosco Uwinkindi was one such 
pastor, and so he transferred his priorities from being spiritual guide to 
becoming a political player.  As a radical member of the PARMEHUTU, 
Uwinkindi is accused of advocating for the extermination of Tutsis, whom 
he referred to as the inyenzi, 69  meaning “cockroaches” in Kinyarwanda, the 
native language of Rwandans.70 
Uwinkindi is accused of organizing a group of killers that lived at a 
church and would lead Tutsis there to meet their deaths.71  The group, under 
the leadership of Uwinkindi, is accused of a series of atrocities,72 such as 
allowing Tutsi women and children to stay at the church under the guise of 
refuge, only to have them murdered.73  Additionally, Uwinkindi is accused 
of ordering his men to stop fleeing Tutsis at roadblocks and to execute 
them,74 and for hunting Tutsis who were seeking refuge in swamps.75 
In July 1994, when Uwinkindi fled Rwanda, the remains of 
approximately 2,000 men, women and children were found at or near the 
 
69. Prosecutor v. Uwinkindi, Case No. ICTR-2001-75-I, Indictment, ¶ 3 (Nov. 9, 2001), http://
unictr.org/Portals/0/Case%5CEnglish%5CUwinkindi%5Cindictment%5Cuwinkindi.pdf. 
70. KINZER, supra note 67, at 34. 
71. Uwinkindi, Case No. ICTR-2001-75-I, Indictment, ¶ 3.  The church was known as the 
Kayenzi church, located in the sector of Nyamata, a rural area outside Kigali.  Id. ¶ 2.  Uwinkindi 
directed attackers in groups: one such group contained approximately one hundred people.  Id. ¶ 4. 
72. See id. ¶ 29–30. 
73. Id. ¶ 11.  The women and children were murdered brutally using traditional weapons such 
as machetes. It is alleged that on one occasion, after a woman was killed by gunfire, Uwinkindi 
ordered that traditional weapons be used instead in order to conserve their firearms.  Id. ¶ 24. 
74. Id. ¶ 8. 
75. Id. ¶ 18, 21. 
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church where he and his men conducted their operations.76  Today, the 
church is a memorial, holding the clothing and bones of those that were 
murdered.77  While the bones are kept underground in the basement of the 
church, the garments are kept above ground and stacked in waist-high piles 
on the pews.  In one of these piles, there may be the clothing of Uwinkindi’s 
wife and two children; they were Tutsis, and suffered the same fate as those 
who shared their ethnic identity.78 
III. THE PROSECUTION OF UWINKINDI AND THE FOUR JUSTICE SYSTEMS 
INVOLVED 
To adequately bring Uwinkindi to justice, he should be touched by four 
justice systems.  The first system that will be discussed is the ICTR, and the 
second system to be discussed is gacaca, a traditional Rwanda justice 
system that will be introduced and discussed in this section.  The third 
system of justice is mediation, which can be used to encourage 
reconciliation between the perpetrators of genocide and the family and 
friends of those victimized.  Finally, the fourth system of justice that this 
section addresses is the National Judiciary of Rwanda, which will handle 
Uwinkindi’s case once it is officially transferred from the ICTR. 
A. The ICTR: the First System of Justice Involved in Uwinkindi’s 
Prosecution 
In 2001, the ICTR indicted Uwinkindi for genocide,79 conspiracy to 
commit genocide, and crimes against humanity.80  Uwinkindi evaded arrest 
for nine years until he was discovered and arrested on June 30, 2010 in 
 
76. Id. ¶ 25. 
77. Nyamata Memorial Site, supra note 2. 
78. Uwinkindi, Case No. ICTR-2001-75-I, Indictment, ¶ 25. 
79. The definition of genocide used by the ICTR is “any of the following acts committed with 
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) 
Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical 
destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.”  See Statute of the International 
Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda (hereinafter ICTR statute), art. 2 (Nov. 4, 1994).  This definition 
reflects the definition given to genocide in Article 6 of the Rome Statute for the International 
Criminal Court.  Id. 
80. Uwinkindi, Case No. ICTR-2001-75-I, Indictment. 
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Uganda.81  On June 28, 2011, the first 11bis motion was granted in the 
history of the ICTR to transfer Uwinkindi’s case from the ICTR to 
Rwanda’s national courts.82  However, before this motion was granted, 
another system of justice, known as gacaca, carried out proceedings to bring 
Uwinkindi to justice. 
B. Gacaca Courts: the Second System of Justice Involved in Uwinkindi’s 
Prosecution 
Gacaca is derived from a Kinyarwanda word meaning “the grass,” and 
is a traditional justice system that developed in Rwanda.83  Case hearings 
took place outdoors in full public view as a community-based forum of 
dispute resolution.84  Professional lawyers are barred from participating, and 
the judges, elected from the community, have minimal legal training.85  
Rwanda’s decision to use gacaca to hear genocide cases was controversial.  
Gacaca traditionally had been used to resolve disputes over offenses like 
cattle rustling, and there were doubts as to whether a justice system typically 
used for resolving relatively simple wrongs could be applied to complex 
cases of genocide.86  Ultimately, the government’s decision to implement 
gacaca was based on necessity.  By 2000, only 2,500 cases had been heard 
by the national court system, less than 3% of the total backlog.87  At this 
rate, most accused genocidaires would have died by the time the court was 
ready to hear their cases.88  In response, Rwanda passed legislation in 2001 
to approve the use of gacaca courts for addressing crimes committed during 
 
81. Uwinkindi, Case No. ICTR-2001-75-I, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral to 
the Republic of Rwanda (Trial Chamber, June 28, 2011), http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case%5C
English%5CUwinkindi%5Cdecisions%5C110628.pdf. 
82. See generally id. 
83. CLARK, supra note 4, at 14.  Although an ancient system of justice, gacaca is constantly 
evolving to comport with the contemporary needs of Rwandan society.  Prior to the Belgian colonial 
era, gacaca was based on unwritten laws, but became more formalized under Belgium’s colonial 
rule: evidence was collected, and judgments rendered based on the testimonies given.  Id. at 52–54. 
84. Id. at 1, 14, 52. 
85. Id. at 3. 
86. U.N. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, REPORT ON THE SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
RWANDA SUBMITTED BY THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE, MR. MICHEL MOUSSALLI, PURSUANT TO 
RESOLUTION 1998/69, ¶ 51, E/CN.4/1999/33 (Feb. 8, 1999). 
87. CLARK, supra note 4, at 56. 
88. Id. 
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the genocide.89  By 2010, gacaca tried its last cases. 90  In total, an estimated 
one million cases were tried through gacaca.91 
While the use of gacaca courts increased the rate at which cases were 
tried, and greatly eased the backlog of cases, some human rights groups 
argue that such gains in efficiency should not come at the cost of sacrificing 
due process.92  Genocide suspects are denied the right to legal counsel in 
gacaca proceedings, and some suspects, including Uwinkindi, have been 
tried in absentia.93  Uwinkindi was tried in absentia by gacaca courts on two 
occasions, though the gacaca Appeals Chamber later vacated these 
decisions.94 
Although gacaca’s judgment of Uwinkindi was later rendered void, the 
process of reaching that judgment helped to foster reconciliation in the 
Rwandan community by allowing family and friends of the victims to 
communicate the events they witnessed.95  In gacaca, the process of 
uncovering the truth may be as important as the truth itself.96  Speaking in 
general terms, there are three separate processes undertaken in uncovering 
the truth after a conflict: “truth-telling,” “truth-hearing,” and “truth-
shaping.”97  Truth telling is the public articulation of the truth, usually 
comprised of testimony by witnesses. 98  During Uwinkindi’s gacaca 
hearings, witnesses to his crimes likely had the opportunity to testify as to 
what they saw, and as a result, experience a sense of catharsis through that 
process.  Truth-hearing is the process by which the person listening to the 
 
89. Id. at 3.  In 2001, more than 250,000 gacaca judges were elected to hear the overload of 
genocide cases.  Id. 
90. Id. at 6. 
91. Id. at 51, fn. 8.  While about one million cases have been tried by gacaca, there is debate as 
to the exact number of suspects that have been tried, as a single suspect may be accused of multiple 
crimes, thereby meriting multiple cases.  Id. 
92. Id. at 174.  Human Rights Watch (HRW), was one of the more vocal groups that 
advocated against gacaca due to its lack of due process rights for suspects.  Id. at 34. 
93. Id. at 160.  Due to the diffuse nature of the gacaca courts, the central government of 
Rwanda is often uniformed of developments within gacaca.  As a result, suspects have been tried in 
absentia, even on occasions in which the central government would have otherwise intervened to 
prevent such hearings from taking place. 
94. Uwinkindi, Case No. ICTR-2001-75-I, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral to 
the Republic of Rwanda at 12, ¶31, fn. 43.  Uwinkindi was convicted by a gacaca court on two 
occasions: in May 2009 in the sector of Kayumba, and in August 2009 in the sector of Ntarama.  Id.  
However, the appeals chamber court of gacaca vacated both decisions, holding that it violated the 
Rwanda Transfer Law.  Id. 
95. See CLARK, supra note 4, at 63. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. 
98. Id. at 34. 
16
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 13, Iss. 3 [2013], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol13/iss3/3
[Vol. 13:453, 2013]  
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL 
469 
truth-teller receives the content.99  For friends and families of victims who 
have yet to learn how certain victims died, the process of truth-hearing has a 
healing effect.100  Family and friends of Uwinkindi’s victims would have 
experienced a sense of closure by listening to the witnesses share their 
experiences.  Finally, truth-shaping is the process by which parties external 
to the truth-telling, such as historians, journalists, and the public at large, 
receive information and interpret it.101  To gacaca judges, truth-shaping is 
important to the extent that it teaches moral lessons to Rwandans and makes 
clear a policy of punishing those guilty of crimes.102 
Gacaca, unlike the ICTR, brings justice to genocidaires using 
alternative dispute resolution techniques that have proven to be effective in 
reconciling the family and friends of victims with the perpetrators 
responsible for the deaths of their loved ones.  Gacaca judges serve distinct 
roles as mediators by helping the family and friends of victims to 
communicate with the accused perpetrators, who in turn, may voice 
apologies or recount events.103  This type of exchange between victims and 
perpetrators is absent from ICTR proceedings.  While gacaca judges are 
helpful in serving as mediators, professional mediators outside the gacaca 
framework have also been helpful in fostering reconciliation in Rwanda. 
C. Mediation of Apology and Forgiveness: the Third System of Justice that 
Should Be Involved in Uwinkindi’s Prosecution 
The concept of using mediation to foster apology and forgiveness, and 
thereby instill a sense of justice, is elucidated in the documentary, As We 
Forgive,104 which explores Rwanda’s process of reconciliation after the 
genocide.  As We Forgive portrays how a mediator, Pastor Guhegi, helped to 
reconcile two Rwandans, identified by their first names: Rosaria and 
Saveri.105  Saveri had killed Rosaria’s sister and her sister’s children during 
the genocide.106  After Saveri served prison time as punishment for his 
 
99. Id. at 34. 
100. Id. at 34. 
101. Id. at 192. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. at 168. 
104. AS WE FORGIVE (Image Bearer Pictures 2008). 
105. Id. 
106. Id. 
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crimes, he was released.107  The documentary portrays how a mediator, 
Pastor Gahigi, helped Rosaria and Saveri reconcile and live together in the 
same community.108  Rosaria was devastated by the loss that Saveri had 
inflicted on her.109  They had been friends before the genocide, but when the 
civil war commenced, Saveri turned on Rosaria and her family.110  Even 
after Saveri had served his sentence, Rosaria still held resentment against 
him for her suffering.111 
Pastor Gahigi, acting as a mediator between Rosaria and Saveri, helped 
to foster reconciliation between the two.112  Rosaria supported herself by 
growing a cereal crop called sorghum.113  After harvesting her crop, Rosaria 
had to carry out the process of separating the seeds from the harvested 
plant.114  Alone, Rosaria would neither be able to process her harvest before 
pests destroyed it, nor could she afford to hire workers to help her.115  Pastor 
Gahigi suggested that Saveri, as a step towards reconciling with Rosaria, 
offer to help her process her harvest.116  Rosaria accepted, and perhaps as a 
result of Saveri’s labor contribution, she was eventually able to release some 
of her resentment towards him.117  His act of volunteering both helped 
Rosaria and allowed her to trust him more.118  The dynamic that arose as a 
result of the Pastor Gahigi’s mediation is represented in Appendix 1, and is a 
specific example of the more general dynamic of mediated apology, 
forgiveness, and reconciliation. 
Legal scholar Lee Taft describes apology as valuable because it “offers 
the offender a vehicle for expressing repentance and the offended an 
opportunity to forgive.”119  Unfortunately, the geographic distance between 
Rwanda and the ICTR in Tanzania prevented any type of mediation between 
the family and friends of the victims of the genocide and the genocidaires 
charged by the ICTR.  However, with Uwinkindi’s transfer to the 
jurisdiction of the National Judiciary of Rwanda, there is more of a 
 
107. Id. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. 
117. See id. 
118. See id. 
119. Lee Taft, Apology Subverted: The Commodification of Apology, 109 YALE L. J. 1135, 
1138 (2000). 
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possibility of interaction between him and the family and friends of victims.  
Unlike Saveri, Uwinkindi most likely will not be in a position to perform 
labor contributions for the loved ones of his victims, but he may be able to 
make a verbal apology, should he feel such a sentiment.  Taft emphasizes 
that apology is essential for both the offender and the offended to heal and to 
move forward,120 and so the ICTR and National Judiciary of Rwanda should 
make efforts towards involving a mediator to encourage a verbal exchange 
between Uwinkindi and the loved ones of his victims. 
D. The National Judiciary of Rwanda: the Fourth System of Justice 
Involved in Prosecuting Uwikindi 
While a primary focus of the gacaca courts and mediators is fostering 
reconciliation, the National Judiciary of Rwanda has a broader set of goals.  
The national judiciary is concerned not only with reconciliation, but also 
with how it is perceived by the international community and the Trial 
Chambers of the ICTR.  In order for the ICTR to transfer cases to national 
courts, the ICTR Trial Chamber must be satisfied “that the accused will 
receive a fair trial in the courts of the State concerned.”121  Aside from 
Rwanda, the only country that the ICTR has transferred a case to is 
France.122  In determining whether to allow a case to be transferred from the 
ICTR to the court of another country, the ICTR holds Rwanda to a different 
standard than that of European countries.  While the adequacy of the 
judiciaries in European countries is evaluated based on whether those 
countries’ laws comply with ICTR standards, the adequacy of the Rwandan 
judiciary is evaluated based not only on Rwanda’s laws, but also on how 
Rwanda enforces those laws.123  The separate standard that Rwanda is held 
to, compared to European countries, likely has also been a source of tension 
between Rwanda and the ICTR. 
 
120. Id. at 1138. 
121. Rules of Procedure and Evidence for the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda, Rule 
11bis (June 29, 1995). 
122. Two cases have been transferred to France’s jurisdiction. See Prosecutor v. Bucyibaruta, 
Case No. ICTR-05-85, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral to France (Trial Chamber, 
Nov. 20, 2007), http://unictr.org/Portals/0/Case%5CEnglish%5CBucyibaruta%5Cdecisions%5C071
120.pdf; Prosecutor v. Munyeshyaka, Case No. ICTR-05-87, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for 
Referral to France (Trial Chamber, Nov. 20, 2007), http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case%5C
English%5CMunyeshyaka%5Cdecisions%5C071120.pdf. 
123. Melman, supra note 36, at 1298, 1302–03. 
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Uwinkindi’s case is one of several that the National Judiciary of 
Rwanda has been attempting to gain jurisdiction over for the past five years.  
The climactic granting of the 11bis motion to transfer Uwinkindi’s case from 
the ICTR to Rwanda indicates that the national judiciary, in the eyes of the 
ICTR, is now competent to deliver justice.124  By the time Uwinkindi’s case 
is heard, he will have been touched by three of the four systems that handle 
post-genocide justice: the ICTR, the gacaca courts, and the national 
judiciary.  It has not been formally determined whether a form of mediation 
to foster apology and forgiveness will be used in Uwinkindi’s case.  
However, in addition to helping heal family and friends of victims in the 
genocide, mediation in Uwinkindi’s case would also improve the 
relationship between the ICTR and the National Judiciary of Rwanda.  A 
discussion of this relationship, in the context of the ICTR’s decision to grant 
the 11bis motion in Uwinkindi’s case, follows. 
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE DECISION TO TRANSFER UWINKINDI’S CASE FROM 
THE ICTR TO THE NATIONAL JUDICIARY OF RWANDA 
Prior to granting the 11bis motion in Uwinkindi’s case, the ICTR had a 
confirmed track record of denying requests to transfer cases to Rwanda.  In 
2008, the ICTR entertained and denied a number of 11bis motions, including 
those made in the cases of Jean Baptise Gatete, Yussuf Munyakazi, Gaspard 
Kanyarukiga, and Fulgence Kayishema.125  Although the ICTR praised 
 
124. Uwinkindi’s case may also set precedent for other cases to be transferred from the ICTR 
to the National Judiciary of Rwanda. The prosecutor of the ICTR has already requested the transfer 
of three more accused genocidaires now that the case of Uwinkindi appears to have opened the door 
for the granting of 11bis motions.  James Karuhanga & Edmund Kagire, Rwanda: ICTR Refers 
Another Genocide Suspect to Local Courts, ALL AFRICA (Feb. 24, 2012),   http://allafrica.com/stories
/201202240184.html. The transfer decision in Uwinkindi’s case may even affect the decisions of 
other countries in evaluating whether to extradite alleged genocidaires to Rwanda.  In the past, 
national courts deciding whether to extradite alleged genocidaires to Rwanda had based their 
decisions on the precedent set by the ICTR’s denial of 11bis motions.  Uwinkindi, Case No. ICTR-
2001-75-I, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral to the Republic of Rwanda, ¶ 42.  Now 
that the 11bis motion was granted in the case of Uwinkindi, foreign jurisdictions may begin 
transferring cases to Rwanda. 
125. See Prosecutor v. Gatete, Case No. ICTR-2000-61, Decision On Prosecutor’s Request for 
Referral to the Republic of Rwanda (Trial Chamber, Nov. 17, 2008), http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0
/Case%5CEnglish%5CGatete%5Cdecisions%5C081117.pdf; Prosecutor v. Munyakazi, Case No. 
ICTR-97-36, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral to the Republic of Rwanda (App. 
Chambers, Oct. 8, 2008), http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case%5CEnglish%5CMunyakazi%5C
decisions%5C081008.pdf; Prosecutor v. Kanyarukiga Case No. ICTR-2002-78, Decision on 
Prosecutor’s Request for Referral to the Republic of Rwanda (App. Chamber, Oct. 30, 2008), http://
www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case%5CEnglish%5CKanyarukiga%5Cdicisions%5C081030.pdf; 
Prosecutor v. Kayishema Case No.  ICTR-01-67, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral to 
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Rwanda for aspects of its justice system that inspired confidence in its 
ability to hear transfer cases—such as its impartiality, the ability to 
guarantee adequate representation to defendants, and ensuring humane 
treatment of the defendants—the ICTR nonetheless acknowledged what it 
classified as flaws in the National Judiciary of Rwanda.126 
The primary reasons that the ICTR cited for the denying the 11bis 
motions were the risk that a defendant in a transfer case could be subject to 
life imprisonment with solitary confinement and the lack of an adequate 
witness protection program.127  The ICTR was not cooperative with the 
National Judiciary of Rwanda in resolving the sentencing issue, but was 
cooperative in helping Rwanda to create an adequate witness protection 
program.  Within this section, Part A will discuss the issue of sentencing, 
while Part B will discuss the issue of Rwanda’s witness protection program, 
as well as other areas that the ICTR and Rwanda have been able to cooperate 
on in a positive way.  Part C will then offer suggestions to help the ICTR 
and National Judiciary of Rwanda better cooperate with each other in a 
manner that embodies the spirit of the progress made on Rwanda’s witness 
protection program. 
A. Life Imprisonment with Solitary Confinement as a Possible Sentence in 
a Transfer Case 
Although Rwanda passed legislation in July 2007 to prevent the 
imposition of the death penalty, under its Death Penalty Abolition Law,128 
the ICTR was not convinced that this legislation would guard against the 
possibility of defendants in transfer cases being subject to life imprisonment 
 
the Republic of Rwanda (Trial Chamber, Dec. 16, 2008), http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case%5C
English%5Ckayishema%5Ctrail%20chamber%5C081216.pdf . 
126. See Gatete, Case No. ICTR-2000-61, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral to the 
Republic of Rwanda ¶¶ 28, 30, 60–64, 83; Munyakazi, Case No. ICTR-97-36, Decision on 
Prosecutor’s Request for Referral to the Republic of Rwanda ¶¶ 20, 38, 40; Kanyarukiga, Case No. 
ICTR-2002-78, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral to the Republic of Rwanda, ¶¶ 16, 27, 
31. 
127. See Gatete, Case No. ICTR-2000-61, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral to the 
Republic of Rwanda, ¶¶ 60–64; see also Munyakazi, Case No. ICTR-97-36, Decision on 
Prosecutor’s Request for Referral to the Republic of Rwanda, ¶¶ 20, 38, 40; Kanyarukiga, Case No. 
ICTR-2002-78, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral to the Republic of Rwanda, ¶¶ 16, 27, 
31. 
128. Death Penalty Abolition Law, Organic Law No. 31/2007, art. 2 (Rwanda) (2007). 
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with solitary confinement.129  Rwanda’s Death Penalty Abolition Law allows 
for life imprisonment with special provisions.130  The ICTR argued that one 
such special provision that could be allowed under this law is life 
imprisonment with solitary confinement.  Such a punishment would breach 
Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), to which Rwanda is a party.131 
While Rwanda’s legislation on transfer cases specifically bars life 
imprisonment with solitary confinement, the ICTR nonetheless held that 
Rwanda’s Death Penalty Abolition Law created an unacceptable level of 
ambiguity.132  Therefore, a major reason why the ICTR refused to transfer a 
case to Rwanda was the fear that it would impose a sentence of life 
imprisonment with solitary confinement on a defendant.133  Even after 
Rwanda eliminated this ambiguity by passing a law in 2008 that modified 
the Death Penalty Law such that life imprisonment with “special provisions” 
could not be applied to transfer cases, the ICTR was still not satisfied.134  
The ICTR expressed the concern that Rwanda’s law, though on the books, 
might not be properly enforced.135  As a result, the ICTR did not have 
confidence that Rwanda would take sufficient safeguards against such a 
sentence of life imprisonment with solitary confinement.136 
 
129. See Gatete, Case No. ICTR-2000-61, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral to the 
Republic of Rwanda, ¶¶ 60–64; see also Munyakazi, Case No. ICTR-97-36, Decision on 
Prosecutor’s Request for Referral to the Republic of Rwanda, ¶¶ 20, 38, 40; Kanyarukiga, Case No. 
ICTR-2002-78, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral to the Republic of Rwanda, ¶¶ 16, 27, 
31. 
130. Death Penalty Abolition Law, supra note 128. 
131. See Mental Illness, Human Rights, and US Prisons, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, (2009) 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2009/09/22/mental-illness-human-rights-and-us-prisons.  The Human 
Rights Watch (HRW) has interpreted Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR), prohibiting torture and inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, to include 
solitary confinement).  Id.  The international community as a whole affirms the HRW’s stance on 
this point.  See Uwinkindi, Case No. ICTR-2001-75-I, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral 
to the Republic of Rwanda, ¶ 51. 
132. See Gatete, Case No. ICTR-2000-61, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral to the 
Republic of Rwanda, ¶ 9.  Article 21 of Rwanda’s Transfer Law provides that “life imprisonment” 
shall be the heaviest penalty, without any reference to imprisonment “with special provisions.”  
Additionally, Article 9 of the Transfer Law states that “[a]ll legal provisions contrary to this Organic 
Law are hereby repealed.” Despite the language of the Transfer Law, the Trial Chamber held that 
given the potential ambiguity created by the conflicting laws, the possibility that life imprisonment 
in solitary confinement might be applied as a punishment was grounds for denial of the Rule 11bis 
motion.  Id. 
133. Id. 
134. Kayishema Case No.  ICTR-01-67 Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral to the 
Republic of Rwanda, ¶ 27. 
135. Id. 
136. Id. ¶ 14. 
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The ICTR’s hardened refusal to grant an 11bis motion prior to the 
Uwinkindi case raises questions as to the ICTR’s motivation.  The ICTR’s 
press releases focused on the United Nations’ progress in working towards 
achieving international justice, rather than on Rwanda’s healing.137  In a 
children’s book released by the ICTR designed to educate children about the 
Rwanda genocide, the only mention of post-genocide justice is in reference 
to the ICTR without any mention of the gacaca courts or of the National 
Judiciary of Rwanda.138  Perhaps one of the reasons that the ICTR was 
reluctant to transfer cases to Rwanda was to uphold the stature of the 
mechanism charged with arresting the pivotal suspects bearing the greatest 
responsibility in the genocide.  It was only after key changes arose in the 
United Nations Security Council’s stance towards the ICTR that the ICTR 
became willing to loosen its grip on the most pivotal cases and allowed 
Rwanda’s jurisdiction to have the chance of trying them. 
On December 22, 2010, the Security Council passed Resolution 1966, 
calling for the ICTR to expedite its completion strategy.139  The ICTR had 
fallen behind in its timeline of activities.  According to Security Council 
Resolutions 1503 and 1534, passed in 2003 and 2004 respectively, the ICTR 
was supposed to have completed all trial activities by 2008, and all work as a 
whole in 2010.140  Security Council Resolution 1966 acknowledged that the 
completion dates had not been met and envisaged December 31, 2014 as a 
more realistic date for completion.141 
Under Resolution 1966, the ICTR will be replaced with a Residual 
Mechanism, to be instituted July 1, 2012.142  Under the structure of the 
Residual Mechanism, the staff of the Registry and the Prosecutor’s Office 
will be significantly reduced, limiting its capacity to hear as many cases.143  
With the combination of the ICTR’s impending staff reduction and pressure 
to complete its work, political undertones motivated the ICTR to transfer 
 
137. See generally Press Releases, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, http://
www.unictr.org/tabid/64/default.aspx (last visited Feb. 20, 2012). 
138. ICTR Cartoon Book, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, http://www
.unictr.org/Portals/0/English/News/Cartoon%20Book/ICTR%20Cartoon%20Book%202011.pdf 53-
43 (last visited Feb. 20, 2012). 
139. S.C. Res. 1966, ¶ 3 U.N. Doc. S/RES/1966 (Dec. 22, 2010). 
140. S.C. Res. 1503, ¶ 7 U.N. Doc. S/RES/1503 (Aug, 28, 2003); S.C. Res. 1534, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1534 (Mar. 26, 2004). 
141. S.C. Res. 1966, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1966 (Dec. 22, 2010). 
142. Id. ¶ 1. 
143. S.C. Res. 1966, Annex 1, art. 14-15, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1966 (Dec. 22, 2010). 
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Uwinkindi’s case to Rwanda.  Likely, the transfer is part of a trend to ease 
the ICTR’s own caseload. 
Since the ICTR’s 2008 11bis motion decisions, Rwanda did not make 
any additional significant changes to its laws in order to further clarify that a 
penalty of life imprisonment with solitary confinement would not be 
imposed on defendants in transfer cases.  Yet, in the case of Uwinkindi, the 
ICTR did not express concern over the imposition of life imprisonment with 
solitary confinement, while the ICTR had been preoccupied with this issue 
in four cases from 2008.  The opinion in the Uwinkindi case cited no new 
developments in law or circumstances with respect to the sentencing issue, 
but rather, employed a new set of reasoning to the same set of facts. 
Whereas before, the ICTR saw potential for ambiguity in the dual 
application of the Death Penalty Abolition Law and the Transfer Law, in the 
case of Uwinkindi, the ICTR found that Rwanda’s “Transfer Law on 
penalties is consistent with .†.†. this Tribunal, which allows for a maximum 
penalty of life imprisonment.”144  Given the fact that the ICTR’s political 
climate experienced dramatic developments between 2008 and the granting 
of the 11bis motion in the 2011 Uwinkindi case, it is likely that the ICTR’s 
change of heart towards Rwanda’s supposedly ambiguous legislation 
stemmed more from the ICTR’s own shift in goals towards expediting its 
work, than any additional clarifications on the part of Rwanda. 
The ICTR, as an entity of the United Nations and not Rwanda, does not 
have a duty to consult with the Rwanda judiciary in executing its duties.  
There appears to have been little discussion between the ICTR and Rwanda 
in addressing Rwanda’s laws on the penalty of life imprisonment.  The net 
effect of this lack of discussion is a sentiment that the ICTR acts 
independently of Rwanda and Rwandans—a negative consequence that the 
ICTR should seek to avoid.  While the communication between the ICTR 
and National Judiciary of Rwanda regarding the supposed ambiguity of 
Rwanda’s laws reflects elements of a disharmonious relationship, there are 
other areas of the relationship between the ICTR and Rwanda that have 
proven to be cooperative, especially over the past several years. 
B. Rwanda’s Witness Protection Program, and Other Areas of 
Collaboration Between  the ICTR and Rwanda 
In recent years, the ICTR has begun allowing Rwanda to be more 
involved in the process of its international justice.  Despite the past conflicts 
that have arisen between the ICTR and the National Judiciary of Rwanda, 
 
144. Uwinkindi, Case No. ICTR-2001-75-I, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral to 
the Republic of Rwanda, ¶ 49. 
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relations have improved as the ICTR and Rwanda have increased their 
collaborative efforts.  The ICTR has set up thirteen satellite centers 
throughout the country,145 created an internship program for Rwandan 
students,146 and has supported Rwanda in establishing and strengthening of 
its Witness Protection Unit (WPU).147  While the ICTR’s rationale 
concerning the sentencing issue discussed previously is symptomatic of the 
ICTR’s lack of trust of the National Judiciary of Rwanda and desire to serve 
the ICTR’s own interests of fostering international justice, the collaborative 
efforts between the ICTR and Rwanda reflects potential for developing a 
more trusting relationship that serves both the interests of the ICTR and 
Rwanda. 
Specifically, assistance with the WPU in Rwanda made the ICTR feel 
more confident that the National Judiciary of Rwanda would be able to 
provide for the protection of witnesses testifying in-country.148  Based in 
largely on Rwanda’s development of the WPU, the ICTR granted the 11bis 
motion in the case of Uwinkindi, believing that international justice would 
still be carried out effectively with the transfer of his case to Rwanda.  The 
National Judiciary of Rwanda, in turn, was satisfied in having the ability to 
prosecute his case in-country. 
The ICTR also commended Rwanda for making changes in its 
legislation that would make it easier for witnesses to testify in transfer cases 
without worrying about the consequences of their testimony.  When the 
ICTR handled the 2008 11bis motions, the ICTR held that Rwanda’s 
Genocide Ideology Law could make defense witnesses afraid to testify.  As a 
result, the ICTR held that the defense may not be able to call a sufficient 
number of witnesses due to fear of testifying.149  This is especially true in 
light of Rwanda’s law against genocide ideology, under which any person 
 
145. Dieng, supra note 51, at 408. 
146. Id. at 410. 
147. Id. at 411–12. 
148. Although the ICTR advocates for protection of witnesses, the ICTR itself has been 
accused of subpar treatment of witnesses in its own proceedings.  For example, while European 
witnesses testifying at trials were placed in hotels, Rwandan witnesses were instead placed in dorm 
rooms.  Such treatment on the part of the ICTR towards Rwandans has contributed to the feeling of 
disapproval on the part of some members of the Rwandan community towards the ICTR.  Survivors 
and Post Genocide Justice in Rwanda: Their Experiences, Perspectives, and Hopes, AFRICAN  
RIGHTS AND REDRESS (Nov. 2008),  http://www.redress.org/downloads/publications/Rwanda%20
Survivors%2031%20Oct%2008.pdf, at 55–59. 
149. Kanyarukiga, Case No. ICTR-2002-78, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral to 
the Republic of Rwanda, ¶¶ 26, 27. 
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making statements either supporting or denying the Rwanda genocide may 
be subject to punishment.150 
The ICTR held that “regardless of whether [witnesses’] fears are well-
founded,” the fact that witnesses may be unwilling to testify for the defense 
in a transfer case raised serious doubts as to whether a fair trial could be 
executed.  However, Rwanda addressed this problem by amending its 
Transfer Law in 2009 to include immunity for “anything said or done in the 
course of a trial.”151  As a result, defense witnesses would not have to be 
afraid of testifying in a manner that would violate Rwanda’s Genocide 
Ideology Law.  This change was a factor in the ICTR’s decision to grant the 
11bis motion in Uwinkindi and is an example of how communication 
between the ICTR and Rwanda lead to improved legislation and policies 
within Rwanda. 
However, there are also areas in which the ICTR’s lack of clear 
communication with Rwanda has been frustrating.  This is particularly true 
with respect to the issue of video-link technology, which could be used in a 
transfer case to help witnesses outside Rwanda provide testimony.  Some 
defense witnesses residing outside Rwanda, and holding refugee status 
would be unable to testify in-country because travelling to Rwanda could 
cause them to lose their refugee status.152  One possible solution that the 
ICTR considered in 2008 while evaluating 11bis motions was video-link 
testimony.  Although the ICTR held that video-link testimony would likely 
be authorized for cases in which witnesses residing outside Rwanda could 
not testify in person, it nonetheless held that it was “not a completely 
satisfactory solution.”153  The ICTR held that direct witness testimony is 
preferable to that of video link.154  Thus, in 2008, the ICTR held that it 
would disadvantage the defense if its witnesses were to testify by video-link 
while most of the witnesses for the prosecution were to testify in person.155 
However, when the ICTR evaluated the 11bis motion for the case of 
Uwinkindi in 2011, it had a different attitude towards video-link testimony 
 
150. See Shannon E. Powers, Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts: Implications for International 
Criminal Law and Transitional Justice, AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (June 23, 
2011), http://www.asil.org/insights110623.cfm#_ednref23  (citing Law Relating to the Punishment 
of the Crime of Genocide Ideology, Organic Law No. 18/2008 art. 2–3 (Rwanda) (2008)). 
151. Uwinkindi, Case No. ICTR-2001-75-I, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral to 
the Republic of Rwanda, ¶ 61. 
152. Munyakazi, Case No. ICTR-97-36, Decision on Appeal Against Decision on Referral 
Under Rule 11bis, ¶ 46. 
153. Id. ¶ 42.  The Appeals Chamber agreed with the Trial Chamber that video link would not 
be a completely satisfactory solution.  Id. 
154. Id. 
155. Id. 
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than it did in 2008.  Whereas before, the ICTR held that the use of video-link 
testimony would be a disadvantage when compared to in-person testimony, 
the ICTR held in Uwinkindi that the availability of video-link facilities 
would provide sufficient availability of witnesses for the defense.156  Thus, 
the ICTR held that video-link facilities could in fact be used to allow 
witnesses unable to travel to Rwanda to testify, without disadvantaging the 
defense.157  The ICTR’s change in disposition towards the use of video link 
technology and subsequent granting of the 11bis motion may be due, in part, 
to the Security Council’s mounting pressure on the ICTR to complete work 
in Rwanda.  Thus, even in the area of witness testimony, there is still 
potential to improve communication and collaboration between the ICTR 
and Rwanda. 
C. Using Mediation to Improve the Relationship Between the ICTR and 
Rwanda 
In order for the ICTR and Rwanda to better communicate and 
collaborate with respect to conflicts that may arise with the transfer of the 
Uwinkindi case to Rwanda’s national jurisdiction, the use of a neutral third 
party mediator should be considered.  Although the ICTR called for the 
African Commission on Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR) to facilitate 
the transfer of the Uwinkindi case to the National Judiciary of Rwanda, 
ICTR indicated that the role of the ACHPR would be to monitor the 
proceedings of the National Judiciary of Rwanda.158  However, it would 
behoove the ICTR to reconsider the role that the ACHPR should play.  As a 
monitoring mechanism, the ACHPR might be one-sided in communicating 
to the ICTR the status of the national judiciary’s proceedings, without fully 
informing the National Judiciary of Rwanda of concerns that the ICTR may 
develop.  This problem was encountered in February 2012, when the ICTR 
indicated that the transfer of the Uwinkindi case to Rwanda’s jurisdiction 
would be delayed pending an unlikely appeal being made by Uwinkindi’s 
defense (which was ultimately dismissed), and also due to a delay in the 
 
156. Uwinkindi, Case No. ICTR-2001-75-I, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral to 
the Republic of Rwanda, ¶ 113. 
157. Id.  Under the amendments made to Rwanda’s Transfer Law in 2009, testimony could 
also be provided by witnesses outside Rwanda through depositions or by testifying before a judge 
sitting in a foreign jurisdiction.  Id.  ¶ 112. 
158. Id.  ¶ 35. 
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institution of the ACHPR in Rwanda.159  In the transfer case of Uwinkindi, 
and those that will likely follow, a mediation forum would enable the 
National Judiciary of Rwanda to make its concerns heard, and afford the 
ICTR the opportunity to respond accordingly. 
Another issue that may require mediation in the case of Uwinkindi and 
subsequent transfer cases is in reconciling the family and friends of victims 
with the alleged perpetrators.160  One of the benefits of gacaca was that the 
family and friends of victims had the opportunity to confront the alleged 
murderers, and thereby relinquish some of their anger by hearing 
confessions firsthand.  While the gacaca judges acted as mediators between 
the suspects and the public, the ICTR and national judiciary may wish to 
consider incorporating the mediation aspect of gacaca into the proceedings. 
Additionally, if Uwinkindi or another transferee was acquitted, or 
eventually released from prison, the dilemma would exist as to where that 
person would relocate.  Currently, the ICTR provides safe-houses for 
persons who have been acquitted by the ICTR, but are unable to reintegrate 
into Rwanda society, likely because of fear of persecution by family and 
friends of genocide victims.161  In order to address the issue of post-trial 
acquittals, the ICTR may want to encourage the use of mediators like Pastor 
Guhegi in As We Forgive in order to help exonerated suspects reintegrate 
into life in Rwanda without fear of being persecuted by the public at large.  
Mediation would also foster healing on part of the family and friends of the 
victims, as Rosaria was able to release resentment towards the man who 
murdered her sister and her sister’s children.  While the transfer of the 
Uwinkindi case to the national jurisdiction of Rwanda is of momentous 
significance, it could make an even greater impact with the integrated use of 
mediation. 
V. CONCLUSION 
One of the important aspects of a public trial is the effect that it has on 
the community at large.  Public trials often offer a means by which apology 
 
159. Edmund Kagire, Rwanda Dismayed by Further Delay of Uwinkindi’s Transfer, THE NEW 
TIMES (Feb. 25, 2012) http://in2eastafrica.net/rwanda-dismayed-by-further-delay-of-uwinkindis-
transfer/; Uwinkindi, Case No. ICTR-2001-75-I, Decision on Uwinkindi’s Motion for Review or 
Reconsideration of the Decision on Referral to Rwanda and the Related Prosecution Motion 
(Appeals Chamber, Feb. 23, 2012). 
160. See Address by Judge Khalida Rachid Khan, President of the ICTR, to the United Nations 
Security Council - Six Monthly Report on the Completion Strategy of the ICTR Dec 7, 2011, 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/tabid/155
/default%20.aspx?id=1244. 
161. See id. 
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can be offered to the community.  It is through the discourse between the 
offended and the offender that healing can begin to take place. An apology is 
the experience and expression of remorse for the violation of a rule.162  As 
legal scholar Lee Taft explains, “The expression of contrition provides a 
legitimate moral reason for the offended party to grant forgiveness.”163  As a 
result, apology allows forgiveness to take place, which is the “overcoming of 
resentment.”164  The overcoming of resentment, in turn, leads to healing.165 
The transfer of Uwinkindi’s case will aid the process of forgiveness and 
healing on part of the Rwandan people by embodying elements of gacaca.  
In gacaca, there is not only an “active, sometimes acknowledgement of 
crimes committed,” but also a process of mediation in which family and 
friends of victims are able to begin letting go of past offenses committed 
against their loved ones, knowing that justice is being served.166  Allowing 
Rwandans to bear witness as their own country prosecutes Uwinkindi can 
help in the process of forgiveness across the country, more than if the case 
were tried in Tanzania.  With the presence of the ACHPR or another neutral 
entity to serve as a mediator between the National Judiciary of Rwanda and 
the ICTR it will be possible to strive towards national reconciliation as well 
as international justice.167  Despite the tension that has characterized the 
relationship between the ICTR and the National Judiciary of Rwanda in the 
past, its future has the potential for harmony and cooperation. 
  
 
162. Taft, supra note 120, at 1139–40. 
163. Id. at 1144. 
164. Id. at 1143. 
165. Id. at 1145. 
166. CLARK, supra note 4, at 43. 
167. See infra, Appendix 1. 
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